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NOTE
LANDLORD'S DUTY TO THE POLICE-FANCIL V. Q.S.E.
FOODS, INC.
INTRODUCTION
Public employees historically have had difficulty recovering for inju-
ries caused by negligent landowners. The primary source of this diffi-
culty has been the uncertain status of public employees as occupiers of
the premises. Many courts have treated them as mere licensees to whom
landowners owe no duty to make their premises safe.' However, this
classification has been criticized by commentators who have observed
the incongruity of holding that a police officer on a landowner's premises
is not an invitee because there has been no invitation, but that he is a
licensee even though, in reality, the owner has not granted him permis-
sion to enter.' Some courts have added to the confusion by refusing to
classify firemen or police officers as licensees or invitees, stating that
they are sui generis,
In 1961 the Illinois Supreme Court, in Dini v. Naiditch,' attempted
to resolve this confusion by granting firemen and police officers full
invitee status. However, in Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc.,' the Illinois
Supreme Court recently raised fresh doubts about the status of police
officers and firemen as occupiers of another's premises while performing
their duties. The issue in Fancil was whether a storeowner owes a legal
duty to light his premises adequately when a police officer is making a
routine security check. The court held that a storeowner owes no such
duty even when it is foreseeable that burglars could conceal themselves
on the darkened premises and enhance the likelihood of injury to the
police officer.'
1. See, e.g., Aldworth v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936);
Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W.2d 97 (1942); Anderson v. Cinnamon, 366 Mo.
304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955); Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 154 Neb. 805, 49 N.W.2d
707 (1951); Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 192 N.E.2d 38
(1963).
2. See Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises of
Their Own Right, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 340 (1921); Comment, Torts-Are Firemen and
Policemen Licensees or Invitees? 35 MICH. L. REv. 1157, 1159 (1937).
3. See, e.g., Buren v. Midwest Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964); Shypulski v.
Waldorf Paper Products, 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951); Jackson v. Velveray Corp.,
82 N.J.Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (App.Div. 1964).
4. 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
5. 60 I1.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
6. Id. at 558, 328 N.E.2d at 541. The court declined to consider whether the failure to
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On the evening of June 1, 1970, police officer Jack Fancil was mur-
dered while inspecting the premises of Q.S.E. Foods, Inc. This store
previously had been the subject of attempted burglaries.7 Consequently,
the storeowner erected a mercury light to the rear and south side of the
building. Officer Fancil had visited the Q.S.E. premises each night as
part of his regular duties in order to protect the storeowner's property.
The storeowner had actual knowledge of these security inspections; yet,
on the night of the murder he disconnected the power to the mercury
light.
In a wrongful death action filed by Mrs. Fancil, it was charged that
the defendant-storeowner had wrongfully disconnected the exterior illu-
mination with full knowledge of the past burglaries and of the frequent
police patrols, thereby creating an unreasonably dangerous condition
enabling the burglars to conceal themselves in the darkness and fatally
attack the decedent.' The Illinois circuit court dismissed the complaint,
but the appellate court reversed, ruling that the allegations stated a
cause of action.' Relying on sections 448 and 449 of the Restatement of
Torts"0 and cases involving civilians," the appellate court reasoned that
provide adequate lighting constituted a failure to exercise reasonable care after it found
that no legal duty existed.
7. Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 19 Ill.App.3d 414, 415, 311 N.E.2d 745, 746 (5th Dist.
1974).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 418, 311 N.E.2d at 747.
10. The Restatement indicates:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a su-
perseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third
person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a
situation might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §448 (1965).
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard
or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act, whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the
actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.
Id. at §449.
11. The appellate court cited Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972)
and Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943). In Johnston a tenant
was assaulted by a youth who was lurking in a poorly lit vestibule of the defendant's
apartment building which was located in a high crime area. The court held that enhancing
the likelihood of exposure to criminal assaults by failing to provide adequate lighting
constituted negligence. In Neering, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a railroad com-
pany owed a duty to protect a passenger who was waiting on the defendant's train plat-
form from those criminal assaults which reasonably could have been anticipated.
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the defendant owed a duty to protect the patrolling officer against those
criminal acts of third parties which were reasonably foreseeable." On
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the decision of the circuit court
was reinstated. The supreme court held that the appellate court impro-
perly considered whether the criminal acts of the burglars were reasona-
bly foreseeable without first considering if the relationship between the
defendant as a landowner and the police officer as an invitee gave rise
to any legal duty. 3 The supreme court resolved this issue in favor of the
defendant, imposing no duty on the landowner because the risk of being
ambushed was one which was inherent in Officer Fancil's occupation."
The purpose of this Note is to analyze and criticize the approach
taken by the court in Fancil. Upon initial consideration, the court ap-
pears to be applying Section 343 of the Restatement of Torts. A closer
reading reveals that the opinion simply follows prior public employee
decisions refusing to impose a duty on a landlord based on the inherent
risk doctrine. Because this assumption has been a major obstacle to
recovery, the development and policies underlying the doctrine will be
examined. An alternative approach, using the Restatement structure
and suggesting new policy considerations, then will be discussed. This
approach could be used by courts to impose a duty on landlords to
protect police officers in situations like Fancil.
THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT APPROACH
Development of the Inherent Risk Doctrine
In Fancil the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Dini
v. Naiditch, 5 granting invitee status to police officers, and then ana-
lyzed whether Officer Fancil had satisfied the invitee requirements of
Section 343 of the Restatement of Torts." Under this section a court
cannot impose a legal duty upon a landowner for failing to protect the
12. 19 Ill.App.3d at 414, 311 N.E.2d at 747.
13. 60 Ill.2d at 552, 328 N.E.2d at 538.
14. Id. at 558, 328 N.E.2d at 541.
15. 20 II.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
16. 60 Ill.2d at 557-58, 328 N.E.2d at 541. The Restatement provides:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger,
or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the dan-
ger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343 (1965).
[Vol. 26:378
FANCIL v. Q.S.E. FOODS, INC.
invitee from a dangerous condition unless: (1) the dangerous condition
constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm and (2) the landowner should
realize that the invitee will fail to protect himself against the danger.
The court ruled that the plaintiff, Mrs. Fancil, could not meet these two
requirements because Officer Fancil's knowledge of the potential danger
and his special police training justified the defendant's assumption that
Officer Fancil would protect himself from a criminal assault. Most im-
portantly, the court held that the danger created by the defendant was
not an unreasonable risk for a police officer since "the danger of being
ambushed by criminals lurking in poorly illuminated areas is a risk
inherent in the occupation."'"
The court buttressed its interpretation of Section 343 by citing
Netherton v. Arends'5 and Horcher v. Guerin, ,1 two appellate court cases
in which recovery was denied for injuries caused by inherent risks. The
facts of Netherton and Horcher were substantially the same. In each
case, the plaintiff was a fireman who was called to the defendant's
premises to fight a blaze caused by the negligence of the defendant.
Both of the plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of fighting the fire. 0
Finally, in each case the plaintiff based the legal sufficiency of his com-
plaint on the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Dini v. Naiditch.11
In Dini, the plaintiff, a fireman, was severely burned when a stairway
on which he was standing collapsed while he was fighting a fire." The
supreme court held that the plaintiff was an invitee and, therefore, the
landowner owed the plaintiff a duty to make the premises safe for his
reception. 3 The court found that the landowner breached this duty by
creating a serious fire hazard "in close proximity to the inadequately
constructed wooden stairway where the fire was located."' 4 Given these
facts, "the jury could have found that defendants failed to keep the
premises in a reasonably safe condition and that the hazard of fire, and
loss of life to fight it, was reasonably foreseeable." 5
It is arguable that the reference in Dini to the failure of the defendants
to "keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition" related to both
17. 60 Ill.2d at 557-58, 328 N.E.2d at 541.
18. 81 Ill.App.2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143 (4th Dist. 1967).
19. 94 Ill.App.2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (2d Dist. 1968).
20. In Netherton, the plaintiff alleged that he was injured by the inhalation of noxious
fumes and smoke produced by the fire. 81 Ill.App.2d at 339, 225 N.E.2d at 145. In Horcher,
the plaintiff complained of injury to his eye which occurred when he broke a window to
ventilate the building. 94 Ill.App.2d at 246, 236 N.E.2d at 578.
21. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
22. Id. at 412, 170 N.E.2d at 883.
23. Id. at 416-17, 170 N.E.2d at 886.




the fire hazard, a risk inherent in the plaintiff's occupation, and the
inadequately constructed stairway, a defect of the premises. If the land-
owner breached his duty to the plaintiff by failing to "keep the prem-
ises in a reasonably safe condition," and the unsafe condition referred
to in Dini consisted only of the inadequately constructed stairway, there
would have been no reason for the court to emphasize the seriousness
of the fire hazard. Thus, it could be argued that Dini allowed recovery
for injuries resulting from a fire which was negligently started by the
landowner, a risk inherent in the plaintiff's occupation.
However, in Netherton and Horcher, the Illinois Appellate Court
maintained that the negligence in Dini was the inadequate construction
of the stairway." Thus, those decisions held that a fireman, or by logical
extension, a police officer could recover only for injuries caused by a
defect of the premises, not for injuries caused by inherent risks. This
interpretation of Dini was expressly adopted by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Fancil.1'
Policies Behind the Inherent Risk Doctrine
Although the appellate court found support in Dini for its holdings in
Netherton and Horcher, both cases also relied upon matters of policy.2
Essentially, there are two policies which undergird the inherent risk
doctrine. Although courts have not always articulated both policies,
both have always been applicable in inherent risk cases.
The first of these policies has its roots in a fact pattern common to
inherent risk cases. Where firemen have been injured fighting fires ig-
nited as a result of the landowner's negligence,30 courts have refused to
26. Horcher v. Guerin, 94 Ill.App.2d 244, 247-48, 236 N.E.2d 576, 578-79 (2d Dist. 1968).
Netherton v. Arends, 81 Ill.App.2d 391, 394-95, 225 N.E.2d 143, 145-46 (4th Dist. 1967).
27. Id.
28. 60 I1l.2d at 558, 328 N.E.2d at 541-42.
29. In Horcher, the court stated:
As to the fire itself, it is the fireman's business to deal with this particular
hazard. He is trained and paid for this. Undoubtedly, most fires can be attrib-
uted to negligence of some nature. Therefore, public policy dictates that a land-
owner does not owe a duty to firemen, upon which liability may be predicated,
to exercise care that a fire does not occur on his premises. The exposure to
liability which would result from such rule would impose an unreasonable bur-
den upon a person who owned or occupied improved land.
94 Ill.App.2d at 248, 236 N.E.2d at 579. Denial of recovery was based on similar grounds
in Netherton. 81 Ill.App.2d at 396, 225 N.E.2d at 146.
30. The fireman's cause of action is based on the theory that the landowner should have
foreseen that his creation of the fire hazard would start a fire and require the fireman to
come onto the premises, risking serious injury. See, e.g., Erickson v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R.,
21 Ill.App.3d 546, 315 N.E.2d 912 (1st Dist. 1974); Horcher v. Guerin, 94 Ill.App.2d 244,
236 N.E.2d 576 (2d Dist. 1968); Netherton v. Arends, 81 Ill.App.2d 391, 225 N.E.2d 143
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impose liability on the landowners. The reason for this refusal was the
fear that landowners might hesitate to summon the aid of firemen be-
cause of the possibility of a lawsuit in the event one of them should
suffer an injury. Since fires constitute a threat to the public, it is clearly
preferable that they be given attention by trained personnel as quickly
as possible.' Consequently, in order to eliminate hesitancy on the part
of landowners to call for help, courts deny recovery as a matter of policy
in spite of the relative carelessness of the landowner in creating the
dangerous condition."
It is only when the landowner's negligence creates the need for the
police officer or fireman to enter the premises that this first policy ap-
plies.3 However, this fact was not present in Fancil. The negligence of
the defendant did not create the need for Officer Fancil to enter the
premises and confront the danger. Here, as the defendant knew, Officer
Fancil entered the premises as part of his nightly inspections. Because
of this fact, the defendant in Fancil was not suddenly faced with the
dilemma whether to handle the burglars himself or summon the police
and risk a possible lawsuit in the event of injury to an officer. As a result,
there was no ground for applying a policy designed to encourage land-
owners to seek the aid of the police.
The second policy upon which the inherent risk doctrine is based
might be termed assumption of the risk. In their decisions, including
Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., courts essentially are ruling that police
officers and firemen assume the risks incidental to their respective pro-
fessions.3' The reasoning behind this policy is that no duty is owed to
police officers and firemen for services for which they are paid and
trained.35
The policy of assumption of the risk is evident in Fancil. However,
this policy may not be a sufficient basis for extending the inherent risk
doctrine to Fancil-type cases. The inapplicability of the first policy
underlying the traditional inherent risk doctrine should have prompted
the Illinois Supreme Court to analyze the duty issue more cautiously.
It is submitted that the court should have examined critically whether
(lst Dist. 1967); Jackson v. Velveray, 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (1964).
31. See Suttie v. Sun Oil Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 3, 5-6 (Phila. Co. 1931).
32. Id.
33. See cases cited in notes 30 & 31 supra.
34. See, e.g., Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 273, 157 A.2d 129, 130-31 (1960), where the
court stated: "it is quite generally agreed the owner or occupier is not liable to a paid
fireman for negligence with respect to the creation of the fire . . . . The rationale of the
prevailing rule is sometimes stated in terms of assumption of risk. ... See also Horcher
v. Guerin, 94 Ill.App.2d 244, 248, 236 N.E.2d. 576, 579 (2d Dist. 1968); Buren v. Midwest
Industries, Inc., 380 S.W. 96, 98 (Ky. App. 1964).
35. Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. at 274, 157 A.2d. at 131.
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all risks inherent in the occupation of police officers are reasonable. In
addition, the court should have considered alternative public policies
which warrant placing responsibility on a landlord in situations like
Fancil.
THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Are all inherent risks reasonable?
Following the traditional inherent risk analysis, the Illinois Supreme
Court in Fancil concluded that police officers cannot recover for injuries
caused by risks inherent in their occupation because such dangers are
reasonable to them." While the opinion explicitly referred to the reason-
ableness of inherent dangers, the court offered no factual basis for this
conclusion. Admittedly, the court attempted to justify its position by
stating that police officers are armed and trained to protect themselves
against inherent dangers which they might confront while patrolling a
darkened area. 37 Although these factors are relevant in evaluating
whether a dangerous condition is reasonable, they are not determina-
tive. Training is undoubtedly helpful in enabling a police officer to
protect himself when he can see his adversary; it may be of no value
when he cannot see the adversary. Thus, it is possible that no amount
of training can protect a police officer from ambush by a criminal hidden
under the cover of darkness. If this is true, then there is no justifiable
basis for claiming that the risk is reasonable simply because apprehend-
ing burglars is part of the officer's job.
Consequently, the court should have determined whether the training
received by Officer Fancil would have enabled the average police officer
to protect himself before ruling that the danger of patrolling the dark-
ened premises was reasonable. In fact, inquiring into the ability of an
invitee to protect himself against a potential danger would seem to be
the only way to determine whether a risk is reasonable or unreasonable.
38
36. 60 1Il.2d at 558, 328 N.E.2d at 541.
37. Id.
38. In the usual case, unlike the situation in Fancil, an invitee will only be able to
recover against the landowner if the injury is caused by a hidden defect. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 394 (4th ed. 1971). When the defect is not hidden the general
rule is to dismiss the action since the invitee is usually free to avoid the obvious risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A. The reasonableness of the danger, measured
by the ability of the invitee to protect himself, is rarely discussed since the hidden aspect
of the danger is a sufficient basis for finding the danger unreasonable. In these cases the
duty of the landowner to warn the invitee depends upon whether the landowner should
have discovered the existence of the dangerous condition. See Appendix to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 343, containing annotated cases decided under section 343.
In situations such as Fancil, however, where the invitee is obligated to proceed against
[Vol. 26:378
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It is the ability of the invitee to protect himself which, in large measure,
determines the likelihood of harm; and it is the likelihood of harm which
determines the magnitude of the risk. By failing to make such an in-
quiry, the court, in effect, held that inherent risks are reasonable per se.
The likelihood of harm, however, is not slight when a landowner
knowingly fails to illuminate an area which previously has been burglar-
ized. If, in fact, the court had inquired into the ability of Officer Fancil
to protect himself, it would have discovered available evidence which
indicates that the Fancil-type case is by no means rare. A recent Justice
Department study shows that many of the circumstances which were
present in Fancil are often present in fatal assaults on law enforcement
officers, namely: (1) the fact that the assault took place on commercial
premises, (2) that the suspect was engaged in the commission of a sepa-
rate offense, (3) that the separate offense was burglary, and (4) that the
a known danger, the unreasonableness of the condition is not as apparent since the danger
is not hidden. Here, the proper test for determining when the condition is unreasonably
dangerous is an analysis of whether the invitee can be expected to protect himself in the
specific situation. The distinction is developed by Harper and James in THE LAW OF
TORTS:
People can hurt themselves on almost any condition of the premises. That is
certainly true of an ordinary flight of stairs. But it takes more than this to make
a condition unreasonably dangerous. If people who are likely to encounter a
condition may be expected to take perfectly good care of themselves without
further precaution, then the condition is not unreasonably dangerous because
the likelihood of harm is slight.
HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1489-90 (1956). Conversely, if a person cannot be
expected to take good care of himself, a likelihood of harm exists and the danger is
unreasonable. This approach was expressly applied in Dawson v. Payless for Drugs, 248
Ore. 334, 340, 433 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1967), in favor of an invitee who slipped on icy steps.
The situation is analogous to Fancil in that the invitee was under an obligation to walk
the steps and encounter the known danger. The Oregon court reasoned that the danger
constituted an unreasonable risk of harm by stating:
[Ilt is pointed out that an ordinary flight of stairs in a common outdoor setting
is not an unreasonably dangerous condition, whereas the same stairway covered
with ice may be. In the latter circumstance, "the condition of danger is such
that it can not be encountered with reasonable safety even if it is known and
appreciated." (citation omitted)
Id.
For similar cases holding the landowner liable for the creation of slippery or icy condi-
tions of the premises, see Adams v. R. S. Bacon Veneer Co., 162 N.W.2d 470 (Ia. 1968);
Paterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 144 N.W.2d 555 (1966), Csizmadea v. P.
Ballantine and Sons, 287 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1961), King Coopers, Inc. v. Mitchel, 140 Colo.
119, 342 P.2d 1006 (1959).
In Fancil, therefore, the ability of the officer to protect himself is the important inquiry.
A bald assertion of the officer's general training does not answer the question whether his
training afforded him any protection against the hidden burglar on the night of his mur-
der. For a discussion of a police officer's obligation to proceed against dangerous condi-
tions, see note 53 infra.
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attack came without warning." Obviously, if police officers often are
injured under these circumstances,"0 they may not be able to protect
themselves very well. If the test for reasonableness of a particular risk
is the ability of the invitee to protect himself against it, the risk in Fancil
arguably was unreasonable.
In a different but analogous context, courts have allowed police offi-
cers to recover for injuries despite the fact that the officer was confront-
ing a risk inherent in his job. Most notably, courts have allowed such
recovery in cases where the officer was injured as a result of a high speed
chase." They have frequently based their decisions on the fact that the
officer not only has a legal right but a duty to pursue and attempt to
apprehend the speeder. The performance of such a duty, it is reasoned,
cannot constitute a defense against a suit for damage."
The California Court of Appeals discussed this issue in McAllister v.
Cummings3 in which the court sustained an action for injuries to a
highway patrol officer whose motorcycle collided with the defendant's
car, which had improperly entered the highway. The collision occurred
while the officer was pursuing another traffic violator. The defendant
requested the court to instruct the jury regarding assumption of risk, as
he contended that highway patrol officers assume the risks of the road.
The court refused to tender such an instruction, noting that an officer
of the law, charged with the duty of pursuing traffic violators, does not
assume the ordinary hazards of the highway." The ruling rested on the
fact that a police officer has no choice about performing his duties. It is
sufficient if under the circumstances the assumption of risk was practi-
cally unavoidable. Most importantly, the court reasoned that a police
39. Chapman, Perspectives on Police Assaults in the South Central United States,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT Assis-
TANcE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 13, 22 (1974), cited in Brief for Americans
for Effective Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae at 5, Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60
1lU.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
40. F.B.I. statistics reveal that sixty percent of all police assaults occur between 8:00
p.m. and 4:00 a.m. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 173 (1974). F.B.I. statistics further disclose
that the investigation of burglaries is the third most dangerous police activity. UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 37-38 (1974).
41. See, e.g., Clausen v. Hightower, 527 P.2d 922 (Colo. App. 1975) (sheriff allowed to
recover for injuries suffered while pursuing a car speeding at 130 miles per hour); Collins
v. Christenberry, 170 S.E.2d 515 (N.C. App. 1969) (highway patrolman sued and re-
covered for damages resulting from his attempts to apprehend the defendant, a speeder
in a stolen car); Brechtel v. Lopez, 140 So.2d 189 (La. App. 1962) (police officer allowed
to recover for injuries when forced to pursue the defendant at speeds up to 105 miles per
hour).
42. Brechtel v. Lopez, 140 So.2d at 193; Clausen v. Hightower, 527 P.2d at 923.
43. 191 Cal.App. 2d 1, 12 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1961).
44. Id. at 9, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
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officer may be unable to protect himself against certain risks which are
a part of his job:
An officer is employed by a city to direct traffic. From the very nature
of this work he cannot be expected to keep as sharp a lookout for
approaching vehicles, and he has a right to have the same degree of care
exercised for his safety as any other person lawfully in the street. 5
In these speeding cases the police officers were confronting risks inher-
ent in their occupation. Although police officers are paid and trained to
apprehend speeders, courts have permitted recovery. This is a realistic
approach recognizing that an assumption of risk defense is inapplicable
when the police officer is obligated to confront a risk that is highly
dangerous despite his training.
Admittedly, the speeding cases do not involve the precise issue raised
in Fancil whether a legal duty is owed by a landowner to a police officer-
invitee. However, the assumption of risk defense rejected in McAllister
v. Cummings" is similar to the assumption of risk policy applied by the
courts in determining that a landowner owes no legal duty to protect
officers against dangerous conditions inherent in their occupation. 7 In
future litigation courts should make use of the rationale and spirit of
these speeding cases. Their message is clear: Police officers do not as-
sume the risks of all dangers inherent in their occupation.
Should the landlord foresee that a police officer will not protect himself?
Under Restatement analysis, a finding of unreasonable risk is not
sufficient to impose a duty on the landlord. It also must be established
that the invitee's failure to protect himself was foreseeable.18 Addressing
itself to this second component, the court in Fancil held that the land-
lord could justifiably assume that the policeman would protect himself.
The court noted that the policeman knew of the previous burglaries and
was armed. The court also suggested that Officer Fancil proceeded
against a known danger because the lack of illumination was obvious to
all.N Generally, this factor alone would be sufficient to dismiss the ac-
tion since a landowner has no duty to prevent an invitee from encounter-
ing an obvious danger." It is usually sufficient for a landowner to warn
45. Id. at 10, 11, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 423, 424 quoting 2A BLASHFIELDS CYCLOPEDIA OF AuTo-
MOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1573 (perm ed. 1927).
46. 191 Cal.App.2d 1, 12 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1961).
47. See cases cited in note 34 supra.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343(b).
49. 60 1ll.2d at 557, 328 N.E.2d at 541.
50. Id. at 558, 328 N.E.2d at 541.
51. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 394 (4th ed. 1971).
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the invitee of unknown defects on the premises. Presumably, once these
dangers are exposed the landowner has satisfied his duty and the invitee
is free to avoid the harm.
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule when the invitee
is likely to proceed against the danger despite its obviousness. Thus, in
circumstances in which the invitee is required to encounter a known
danger, the obviousness of the condition is not enough to justify a con-
clusion that the landowner has no duty. Section 343(A) of the Restate-
ment"2 requires landowners to take positive steps to protect invitees if
there is a likelihood of harm despite the obviousness of the danger. It
should be noted that Officer Fancil was not free to avoid the obvious
danger since an officer can be cited for neglect of duty for failing to
respond." Therefore, although the lack of lighting was obvious, a duty
could be imposed consistent with the Restatement.
The court's reliance on officers being armed and trained again indi-
cates an assumption that the police will protect themselves from any
job-related danger. As previously discussed, this assumption may not be
valid. " In addition, the facts in Fancil present a situation in which a
52. Section 343A(1) of the Restatement states:
A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them
by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to
them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge
or obviousness.
RE-STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343A(1) (1965). Comment f to this section notes addi-
tionally:
There are, however, cases in which the possessor of land can and should antici-
pate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee not-
withstanding its known and obvious danger. In such cases the possessor is not
relieved of the duty of reasonable steps to protect him, against the known or
obvious condition or activity, if the possessor has reason to expect that the
invitee will nevertheless suffer physical harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343A, Comment f (1965).
53. Bagat v. Police Bd., 95 Ill.App.2d 45, 238 N.E.2d 89 (1st Dist. 1968). In this respect,
the police officer is more likely to suffer injury than the average lay person because the
lay person is free to avoid an obviously dangerous situation. Additionally, the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., in its textbook on police patrol functions notes
that:
[Cirime prevention cannot be accomplished from the front seat of an automo-
bile.-It can only be done on the street or in the bars or in the alleys when and
where the criminal is most likely to strike . . . . The beat officer who fails
aggressively to seek and correct crime breeding conditions is an officer who fails
to serve. The man who feels that patrol involves only responding to radio calls
is a man who is performing only the secondary task to which he is assigned.
O'CONNOR & VANDERBOSCH, THE POuCE PATROL FUNCTION 31-32 (1967), cited in Brief for
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae at 8, Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods,
Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
54. See text at notes 37-40 supra.
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countervailing public policy of effective crime control should have been
considered by the court. The presence of illumination and its positive
effect on the routine patrol function is no longer a subject of speculation.
It deters crime; it helps a patrolling officer detect criminal activity; and
it facilitates an officer's efforts to apprehend the suspects at the scene
of a crime." Logically, it would also reduce the incidence of surprise
attacks on officers who enter someone's premises in the performance of
their duty. The landlord in Fancil knew of the risk of burglary and had
provided lighting which could minimize the risk. When the landlord
knows of the foreseeable danger and is able to protect the police officer,
it is unwise to allow him to hide behind an unproven assumption that
police officers can protect themselves in any dangerous situation. Unfor-
tunately, by refusing to impose a legal duty the Fancil decision discour-
ages landowners from making positive contributions toward their own
protection and the safety of the patrolling officer.
The consequences of the ruling are two-fold. First, permitting land-
owners to knowingly ignore dangerous conditions on their premises
subjects the officer to increased and unnecessary danger. Police officers
usually will patrol the premises regardless of the increased danger as
they can be cited for neglect of duty for failing to do so." Second, the
Fancil holding reflects an improper attitude regarding society's obliga-
tion toward crime control. The police cannot protect the public single-
handedly, and the public should not be allowed to act as if they can. In
small ways members of the public should be encouraged to assume some
reciprocal responsibility in aiding those police officers who protect their
homes and stores.
The Fancil decision discourages storeowner participation by allowing
the defendant to knowingly disconnect his mercury light although it
increased the danger to officers patrolling the darkened premises. The
court places the entire burden on the officer. The officer must confront
dangers beyond his control, yet the landowner is not forced to minimize
55. A study in Oakland, California revealed a 23% decline in commercial burglaries and
decrease of up to 10% in other areas after installation of improved lighting. Jones, The
Impact of Street Lighting on Crime and Traffic Accidents, The Library of Congress,
Legislative Reference Service 10 (August 1970), cited in Brief for Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae at 7, Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552, 328
N.E.2d 538 (1975). In Kansas City, Missouri a study showed a reduction in commercial
burglaries of 56% and a 67% reduction in assaults committed upon commercial premises
after installation of improved lighting. Wright, The Impact of Street Lighting on Street
Crime, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 84-86 (1974), cited in Brief for Ameri-
cans for Effective Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae at 7, Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc.,
60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
56. Bagat v. Police Bd., 95 Ill.App.2d 45, 238 N.E.2d 89 (Ist Dist. 1968).
19771
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
dangers within his control. Under these circumstances it is not necessary
to approach the issue of legal duty so narrowly. As a California appellate
court has noted:
There are some special situations in which the high potential of risk to
the plaintiff, coupled with the ease of protective steps available to the
defendant have led the courts to expand the relative weight of the
foreseeability factor and thus diminish the other ingredients which
normally compound that broth of elements called duty."7
Fancil was one such situation. Clearly there existed a high potential of
risk to the police officer and protective steps were readily available to
the storeowner by maintaining the light in question at a minimal cost."
The Illinois Supreme Court should not have tolerated this inequitable
apportionment of responsibility. The public's concern for their own
safety, as well as that of the officer, and the storeowner, is ill-served if
the storeowner can refuse to minimize the potential dangers facing the
officer who is protecting his property and conferring an economic benefit
on his enterprise.
CONCLUSION
At stake is the overriding question whether a commercial property
owner has a duty under certain circumstances to minimize the oppor-
tunity for crime and to protect patrolling officers from surprise, and
perhaps fatal assaults. The Illinois Supreme Court refused to impose
such a duty. However, under the alternative approach described herein
courts would be more likely to hold the landowner accountable. In situa-
tions like Fancil, courts could impose a legal duty on the storeowner by
finding that the danger was unreasonable in view of the officer's inabil-
ity to adequately protect himself. When the landlord knows of the dan-
ger and can reduce the risk, he should not be allowed to assume that
the officer will protect himself from a situation he is not free to avoid.
Of course, the imposition of a legal duty does not signal an automatic
57. Wright v. Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal.App.2d 272, 278-79, 40 Cal.Rptr. 812, 815
(dictum). The court ultimately refused to impose a duty on the school district when a five
year old school boy was hit by a car on the way to school.
58. The cost of the light would have been $4.00 per month, including rental of the light
itself. Letter from C.C. Schachtsiek, Rate Administration Supervisor, Central Illinois
Public Service Company, Springfield, Illinois (November 8, 1974), cited in Brief for Amer-
icans for Effective Law Enforcement as Amicus Curiae at 6, Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc.,
60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975). It should also be noted that the amount of energy
consumed in outdoor lighting is insignificant when compared with the monetary loss
prevented by its use. Looney, Position Paper, International Association of Chiefs of Police,
(December 13, 1973), cited in Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement as
Amicus Curiae at 7, Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552, 328 N.E.2d 538 (1975).
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recovery. However, it affords the plaintiff the opportunity to convince
the jury that the landowner's failure to illuminate the premises was the
proximate cause of the officer's injury, in that it enabled burglars to
conceal themselves in the darkness and ambush the inspecting officer.
In the larger context, it establishes a valid public policy favoring citizen
responsibility in reducing crime and protecting officers who risk their
lives to protect the public.
Steven J. Kaminshine
